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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

8795

]. MARVEL HUTCHINSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. All
italics are ours.
FACTS

The law suit in question is one where the County is seeking
a mandatory injunction against the defendant, ordering said
3
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defendant to tear down approximately eight feet of the back
end of a building. This building was constructed pursuant to
an enlargement of an existing building allowed by the County
Board of Adjustment to a point ten feet from the east property
line of the land on which said building is located ( R. 1 to 5).
The la\vsuit arose from an application submitted to the Board
of Adjustment by the defendant through his attorney, LaMar
Duncan, on April 21, 1955 (Exhibit 1-D). In said application,
defendant requested a permit for a 48' x 38' enlargement of
a non-conforming grocery store in a residential R-2 zone, located
at 3065 South 1700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. The grocery
store in question faces west toward 1700 East Street, with its
entranceway being on the southwest corner of said building,
the north line of the building being on defendant's property
line and the south line of said building being approximately
86 feet north from 3080 South Street. There is a parking area
between 3080 South Street and the existing building. The

enlargement sought by defendant would extend the existing
building easterly to approximately 28 inches from the east
property line (Exhibits 1-D, 5-D and 10, R-27 to 29). Subsequently, a hearing on defendant's application \Yas held before the County Board of Adjustment on ~fay 19, 1955. As a
result of the hearing, the Board of Adjustment granted the
request but provided specifically that a distance of 10 feet be
maintained from the east property line (Exhibit 2-D). A letter
\vas sent from the County Board of Adjustment to Mr. Joseph
F. Horne, the Chief Building Inspector, dated May 23, 1955,
with one copy to 11r. LaMar Duncan, the attorney for defendant, and another copy to the District PL1nning Commission
(Exhibit 3-D). Subsequent to this, a letter dated May 27,
4
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1955, fron1 J. F. Horne to Mr. LaMar Duncan was mailed.
Both of these letters contained a statement of the action by the
Board of Adjustment providing that a distance of ten feet
be maintained from the east property line. Mr. Duncan testified
that he was out of town for approximately a week or ten days
in the latter part of May, including Memorial Day, and that
just before he left town he called the County Surveyor's Office
and was informed that the application had been approved.
He then called defendant and told him to go ahead with his
building. Then when he returned to Salt Lake City, he found
the letter, dated May 23rd, (Exhibit 3-D) and learned at that
time of the restriction that the building must not be closer than
ten ( 10) feet from the east property line. He further testified
that at that time he telephoned defendant and told hin1 of the
ten (10) foot restriction (R. 97 to 98). The defendant, J.
11arvel Hutchinson, testified that upon receipt of word fron1
his attorney to go ahead, he had the work started in the
latter part of May or the first part of June (R-32); that this
was before he had obtained his building permit in July (R-33).
The defendant admits that the excavation was all that was
done in regard to the work on the new structute at the time
he learned of the true decision of the Board of Adjustnzent
with the ten ( 10) foot restriction and that this excavation work had only taken two day/ work by the contractor
(R-38).
It is interesting to note that there is a plot plan on
the back of the application for the building permit vvhich
provides the information to the building inspector as to the
dimensions and location of the building on the lot in question.
The building permit was issued on July 5, 1955. The plot plan

5
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on the back of the application shows dimensions of 37' x 40'
(Exhibit 5-D). However, Mr. Hutchinson denies that he placed
the figures of 10 feet on said plat plan. It is interesting to
note that the 37' x 40' dimensions are exactly what \vas granted
to Mr. I-Iutchinson by the Board of Adjustment although he
originally claimed that the application for the building permit
had been presented by him in 1951 or 1952 (R-35). Subsequently, Marjorie L. Griffith from the Salt Lake County
Surveyor's Office, testified that the form used for the application
for the building permit in question was not in use until the
year 1954 (R-68). Subsequently, Mr. Hutchinson came back
to the witness stand and testified that he could have made the
application in the fall of 1954 or the early spring of 195 5
before the date of the application to the Board of Adjustment
of April 21, 1955 (R-110).
Mr. Hutchinson went on to testify that work on his
new addition remained idle at the axcavation stage for
about a month almost into August. At that time, he started
construction again, constructing the building to within 28
inches of his east property line as he had originally started
to do. He stated that he had received the impression from his
attorney that it \vas all right to go ahead (R-40) . The counsel
for Mr. Hutchinson, LaMar Duncan, denied that he told Mr.
Hutchinson to go ahead with his building but stated he inforn1ed
him that he felt it could be ironed out (R-105). Mr. Duncan
stated that he talked \vith Comn1issioner Gunderson~ the
Chairn1an of the Board of Adjusttnent, 11r. 1fulcock, and the
County Surveyor in regard to the hardship of his clienf s

c~1se

and that the door had never been completely closed on his being
6
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able to obtain approval for the building to be built 28 inches
from the east property line.
Mr. Joseph F. Horne, the chief building inspector of Salt
Lake County, stated that on October 9, 1955, while out driving
on a Sunday afternoon, he observed Mr. Hutchinson's building,
which appeared to be two or three feet from the east property
line. He then sent one of his inspectors, Mr. George Daly, out
to inspect 1vfr. Hutchinson's building on the 11th or 12th of
October (R-79). Mr. Daly testified that on Wednesday,
October 12, 195 5, he made an inspection of the Hutchinson
premises. He states that the building was up to the point where
it was ready to have the roof put on and that it was within
approximately three feet of the east property line. l--ie states
that at that time he informed Mr. Hutchinson that he was
in violation and that he was even in violation of his own building permit. Mr. Hutchinson informed Mr. Daly that his attorney
told him that it was OK. Mr. Daly then reported the occurrence to Mr. Horne (R-73-74). Mr. Horne, upon receiving
the report from Mr. Daly called Mr. Hutchinson on the telephone and asked him in effect why he had built in violation,
and Mr. Hutchinson informed him that Mr. Duncan had told
him to go ahead, that the County wouldn't do anything anyway (R-80).
It may be pointed out that by stipulation, pars. 4 and 5
of plaintiff's complaint were admitted by the defendant (R-24).
These paragraphs have to do with the facts that defendant's
property is in a residential R-2 zone, that the grocery business
\vhich he operates on said property is a non-conforming use
and that an addition or enlargement of the non-conforming
use may be granted by the Board of Adjustment.
7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DECISION BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE.

POINT II.
THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ESTOPPEL OR
HARDSHIP TO PREVENT THE COUNTY FROM ENFORCING ITS ZONING ORDINANCES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court sums up its memorandum decision in this
case as follows (R-133):
qit is apparent and clear that the error is not any
wilful violation on the part of the defendant Hutchinson, but one that would not have occurred at all had
Inspector Horne done his duty at the time he should
have done it instead of a month or so later \Vhen the
building was up. And now the inspector seeks to compel the defendant to tear do,vn the ne\Y structure or a
part thereof, which \Vould just \Yreck the building and
its business, and serve no useful purpose. Reason and
equity revolts against such action on a record and a
situation such as this. To make a man who earnestlv
tried to itnprove his store to insure a livelihood foJr
his family without detrin1ent to anyone and, believing
8
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he was in full compliance with the law and was so
advised, must suffer wreck and ruin because a County
Inspector was long dilatory in doing his service, which
had he done promptly as he should have done, the
regulation would not have been innocently violated and
the problem would not have arisen.
((The in junction and order sought by Plaintiff are
denied and the cause of action dismissed.''
T?e court had the following observations in its memorandum decision as to the duties of the building inspector
(R-132):
((By the provisions of the County zoning ordinance
and also the testimony of Inspector Horne, his duty
is not to pass judgment on the material used nor upon
the workmanship of the contractor but merely to see
that the applicant lays his excavation or wall lines the
proper distance from the boundary lines of the property. This, of course, imposes upon him the duty of
making immediate contact with the applicant at the
place of building to see that the lines are properly put
or marked upon the land. There his job is through.
Instead of meeting this duty, he did nothing at all until
one day when he was driving by defendant's place, on
strictly personal business, he saw the structure ready
all but some roofing. So, he stopped and told applicant
to tear it down. At the trial it was freely said that the
error was not itself serious, but the building as erected
was taken as an affront or ornery attitude toward an
official, not the Board of Adjustment. The abutting
property owners testified that the building in its present
structure was not a detriment to their property and so
testified that they preferred it as is, as against the
authorized plan.''
There is no support in the record for the finding made
by the trial court that the violation of the zoning ordinance
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the defendant Hutchinson was an innocent violation. There
is no support in the law for the trial court imposing the duty
on a building inspector to immediately find violations of the
zoning ordinances, and if he does not find said violations,
holding that the county in effect has waived its right to enforce
the zoning ordinances. Furthermore, the foregoing language
is a clear indication that the trial court considered matters
entirely outside of its province, such as the alleged assertion
that the building as erected was taken as an affront or ornery
attitude toward an official, not the Board of Adjustment. Furthermore, the trial court took upon itself the function of
finding that the structure, as it was, was not a detriment to the
abutting property owners and relying on the fact that they
preferred the building as it is rather than as it should be under
the zoning ordinances. Certainly it cannot be disputed that the
determination of what is proper zoning and what is not, is
exclusively for the legislative branch of the county government
and not for the court.
In regard to the trial court's finding of an innocent violation, the evidence, as herefore stated, shows that the defendant, by his own testimony, knew that his building plans were
in violation of the order by the Board of Adjustment at a
time when the only work that had been done on the property
was one or two days of excavation work. Furthermore~ this
excavation work was admittedly done before defendant had
even obtained his building pern1it. Certainly this testimony is
conclusive of the fact that the violation by defendant \vas
not an innocent violation. He kne\Y of the restriction placed
on his building by the Board of Adjusttnent before any sub10
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stantial work had been done, and any misunderstandings
he may have had were clearly misunderstandings between
he and his lawyer. It cannot be contended that the county
should be responsible for any misunderstandings that defendant's own lawyer may have created in the mind of defendant.
It will be remembered that the testimony of defendant was
to the effect that his lawyer advised him to continue on with
the work of his building, and the lawyer testified that he had
not so advised the defendant but had merely told him that
he was confident of getting the county officials to relent 1n
their attitude of strictly enforcing the zoning ordinance.
There is no justification whatsoever for the court holding
as it did that the county cannot enforce its zoning ordinances
if the building inspector does not find violations early. The
most recent pronouncement by this court on this subject is
the case of H. C. Hargraves, Building Inspector for Salt Lake
City vs. Harry L. Young, Kenneth L. Anderson and William
W a/kenhorst, 1955, 280 P2 974, 3 U2d. 175. This case involved carports as shown in the picture in the report ( apparently an aluminum roof held up by steel poles) and whether
or not these carports violated the Salt Lake City Ordinances as
to side yards when the structures intruded into the side yards
required by the city ordinances. The lower court held that the
city ordinance was inapplicable to these carports and that there
\Vas no reasonable relationship between prohibiting such a
structure in side yards and the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the
trial court and held that the ordinance does apply and that
there is a reasonable relationship. The following language at
page 975 appears to be applicable to the case at bar:
11
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((Authorities generally accepting such a conclusion
are in harmony with Gorieb vs. Fox, 274 u·.s. 603,
47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L Ed 1228, and we are impelled to
follow them even though defendants will suffer in a
situation where they acted in apparent good faith not
realizing the import of the ordinances existing at the
time they erected these structures."
The foregoing language shows that the good faith of
the defendant in violating zoning ordinances and the fact that
he will suffer a hardship cannot relieve him of the consequences of violating the zoning ordinances. Furthermore, the
court in the foregoing case held that as to the side yard ordinances, there was a reasonable relationship between prohibiting
such structures and the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. This holding would prohibit the trial court from
considering such matters as the fact that the structure in the
case at bar was not a detriment to the property of the neighbors
and that the neighbors preferred it as it is as against the authorized plan.

POINT II.
TI-IERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ESTOPPEL OR
HARDSHIP TO PREVENT THE COUNTY FROM ENFORCING ITS ZONING ORDINANCES.
Apparently the trial court has based its decision on grounds
of estoppel and hardship. The existing case la\Y on this subject
clearly would not allo\v such a defense in the case at bar. In
the case of Provo City, et al vs. Claudin et al, Utah, 1936, 63
Pac. 2d 570 91 U 60, the city brought suit to enjoin the
operation of a funeral home in a residential class B zone.
12
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Among other defenses, the defendants alleged estoppel. This
alleged estoppel was based on the reason of a permit
to remodel and the remodeling of the building under the
supervision of a building inspector, involving, without protest
or complaint by the city or its officials, the expenditure of
large sums of money. In answer to this contention the court
stated at page 574:
((Assuming that the employees of the city granted
the permit and supervised the building, it vv-as all knowingly without authority or right by defendants, granting
that the Board of Adjustment was acting within its
jurisdiction and its decision had not been overturned.
An estoppel cannot be erected on such a foundation."
The following cases from other jurisdictions fortify and
substantiate the holding of this court in the Claudin case.

McCavic vs. DeLuca, Minn., 46 NW 2nd 873: This was
a law suit between private individuals where the plaintiff's
residences were located on lots adjoining the lot on which
defendant erected a concrete block store building, and the
building was so built that it extended seven feet out in front
of the residences and violated the setback line established by
the city ordinances. The court held that defendant's violation
of the ordinance was not so trivial as to bar the plaintiffs fron1
injunctive relief impelling the defendant to comply -vvith the
ordinance by removing the portion of the building which protruded beyond the setback line.
Everett vs. Capitol lVfotor Transport Conzpany, Mass.}
114 NE 2nd 547: This case held that the doctrine of laches
has no application as to the enforcement by a municipality
of its ordinances.

13
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Corning vs. Town of Ontario, N. Y., 121 NY S 2nd 288:
This case held that the fact that town officers represented to
a property owner that he might use a house trailer as a place
to live and that such representations were relied upon, did
not estop the town from enforcing a zoning ordinance or
justify the granting of a temporary injunction restraining such
attempted enforcement.
Raleigh vs. Fisher, N.C. 61 SE 2d 897: This case involved
a suit by the city to enjoin a defendant from conducting a
bakery in a residential district. It was alleged that officers of
the city had knowingly encouraged or permitted the violation
for 10 years and that the defendant would suffer great hardship if the injunction were granted. The court stated at page
902:

((In the very nature of things, the police power of
the state cannot be bartered away by contract, or lost
by any other mode. This being true, a municipality
cannot be estopped to enforce a zoning ordinance
against a violation by the conduct of its officials in
encouraging or permitting such a violator to violate
such ordinance in times past. (Citing cases.)"
Newton vs. Tou·n of Highland Pa,-k et al._. Texas, 1955, 282
SW 2d 266. The property involved in this la\v suit was located in
a single farnil y dwelling district zoned A -area and consisted of
a lot 71 feet x 225Vz feet with improvements thereon. When the
town of Highland Park was zoned in 1929 the itnprovements
consisted of a two-story brick veneer house \vith accessory
buildings, such as a garage. Later a S\\'imn1ing pool \\·as con~tructed in the rear yard. All of the in1provements confonned
\v ith the provisions of the t0\\'11, s ordinances. Subsequent to
1--1
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that time, however, numerous additions were made. In 1941,
for instance, application was made for a permit to build a
pergola in the rear yard at a cost of $250.00. When this socalled pergola was finished it turned out to be a structure
built to resemble a ship and had cost $60,000.00. The owners
started to use this ship as a commercial center for parties. They
also built fences in the rear to a height of 16 to 20 feet. There
were numerous fences in the front and side yards. The additions
to the structures violated the building code in numerous sections of the ordinance. Over a period of time the town attempted to get removal of the structures that violated the
several ordinances. Although agreements were made, they
were never kept. Finally the suit was started by the town of
Highland Park which sought a permanent injunction ordering
the removal of certain of the structures. It was contended
among other things, by the owners, that the town of Highland
Park was estopped by laches, limitations and lack of diligence
from enforcing the ordinance to certain of the structures in
controversy. The court states at page 275:
"The general rule is that cities in the discharge of
their governmental as distinguished from their proprietary functions cannot be bound or estopped by unauthorized acts of the officers." (Citing cases.)

*

*

*

"It is true that there are exceptions to the rule. The
rule as to the exceptions has been stated by our Supreme Court in City of San Angelo vs. Deutsch, 126
Tex. 532, 91 SW 2d 308, 311; 'The opinion is expressed in a number of decisions that a city may be
estopped even when it is acting in its public capacity

15
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if it has received or accepted benefits from the transaction.' "
The court went on to hold that there had been no such
benefits received by the city in the case in question.
Also see Sharrow vs. City of Dania, Florida, 1955, 83
So. 2d 274, and Town of Eastchester vs. Noble, N. Y., 1956,
148 NY S. 2nd 592.
It will be noted from the foregoing cases that involve
situations where public officials have actively encouraged the
violations in question, the courts uniformly hold that a city
or county can not be estopped by wrongful and unauthorized
action by a public official. In the case at bar, the most that is
claimed by the defendant is lack of action on the part of the
public official in question. The claim is made that because of
the failure of the building inspector to stop the defendant from
violating the zoning ordinance at an early stage, the county
should now be estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The
reasons for denying such a defense in the case at bar are far
more persuasive than they were in the foregoing cases in
which such a defense was held invalid.
It is stated in McQuillin. Municipal Co,-porationJ. 3r.d ed.
vol. 8, page 857:
((Furthermore, it is no defense to the suit that the
defendant will suffer hardship fron1 enforcement of
the ordinance in the particular involved, at least where
the hardship is consequent only on the defendant's
violation of the zoning ordinance."

16
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CONCLUSION
We submit that the trial court ignored the evidence that
the defendant knew of the restriction when he constructed the
major portion of the building in question. Furthermore, the
trial court considered improper matters such as the propriety
of the restriction in question and the personal relations between
the parties involved. The trial court's decision is against exist~
ing law in that it is based on a principle of equitable estoppel
and hardship which is not applicable in the case at bar accord·
ing to the clear line of authorities on the subject. We urge that
the trial court's decision should be reversed and the County
granted its mandatory injunction as it is entitled under the
provisions of Sec. 17-27-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The
upholding of the trial court's decision will emasculate the
pov1er of the County to enforce its zoning ordinances.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK E. MOSS
Salt Lake County Attorney

JOHN L. BLACK
Deputy, Civil Division
Attorneys for Appellant
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